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Introduction 
Competition in European football has always been unbalanced. In every domestic European national 
league there have always been dominant clubs. Besides differences between clubs’ finances due to 
historic, socio-political or economic factors (for example, dominant clubs were typically located in 
large conurbations with big populations) within the respective countries, discrepancies in the clubs’ 
capability to draw from external resources have also characterised the game ever since, both within 
and between leagues. So for example, long before Russian businessman Roman Abramovich entered 
the stage by buying Chelsea London in 2003, there has been a tradition in several leagues for clubs 
being funded by industrial enterprises (e.g. Bayer/Bayer 04 Leverkusen; Volkswagen/VfL Wolfsburg; 
Fiat/Juventus; Philips/PSV Eindhoven; Volvo/Gothenburg) or wealthy individual benefactors (e.g. 
Berlusconi/AC Milan; Moratti/Inter Milan; Cragnotti/Lazio Rome; Walker/Blackburn Rovers) (cf. 
Hoehn & Szymanski, 1999; Sloane, 2009). Moreover, the history of European club football 
competition throughout the 20th century is rife with examples of teams that dominated at different 
periods. Yet there is a sense that a new form of dominance has evolved during the last two decades, 
stimulated by a growing disparity of financial means between clubs, which is largely due to 
exponential increases in broadcasting revenues of clubs from large countries as compared to smaller 
nations (for recent figures, see Deloitte, 2016, pages 9 and 13). Furthermore, it could be increasingly 
observed that money oftentimes is not earned by a club directly through its own business operations 
but rather externally injected. This development is even more aggravated by an increasing debt-led 
player acquisition and salary payment (UEFA, 2004) to achieve sporting success. The excessive extent 
of such practices, providing a few clubs what is felt an unfair advantage, is considered a distortion of 
competition.1 This is why they have been labelled ‘financial doping’ (cf. Müller, Lammert, & 
Hovemann, 2012; Schubert, 2014). Against the background of these and other deficiencies, UEFA 
launched its Financial Fair Play (FFP) initiative in 2009 (UEFA, 2015c). At its simplest, FFP states that 
clubs wishing to participate in European competitions are not allowed to spend more than they 
earn. 
                                                          
1
 For example, in July 2016, the European Commission has concluded that public support measures granted by 
Spain to seven professional football clubs (e.g. Real Madrid, Barcelona) gave those clubs an unfair advantage 
over other clubs in breach of EU State aid rules. The Commission ruled that Spain has to recover the illegal 
state aid amounts from those clubs (European Commission, 2016). 
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 This contribution provides an explanation of ‘financial doping’ as a management concept in 
the context of European club football as well as on UEFA’s FFP regime, which can well be framed as 
the governing body’s attempt to address this issue.2 It will use the metaphor of clubs engaging in 
‘financial doping’ as ‘financial junkies’ to extend the comparison, as ultimately, as with the case of 
drug abuse, extended ‘financial doping’ breaks the health of ‘financial junkies’. A notorious case was 
that of the collapse into bankruptcy in 2011 of Scotland’s Rangers FC, in 2007 being amongst the top 
25 European football clubs as measured by the size of its revenues (Forbes, 2012)3, after 
spectacularly living beyond its means for over a decade.  The remainder of the chapter is structured 
as follows: First, the historic development of financial regulation in European football is briefly 
outlined. The notion of financial doping as well as in what way it undermines the integrity of the 
sporting competition is addressed next. Afterwards, the FFP policy is explained, followed by a critical 
review of its discussion in scholarly literature as well as an outlook on potential future research. The 
final section concludes. 
 
Financial regulation at the turn of the millennium 
The UEFA Champions League (UCL) started in season 1991/92 and can be seen as a 
consequence of the increasing mediatisation and commercialisation of football since the 1980s. An 
increasing appetite of broadcasters and commercial partners led to an enormous increase of money 
flows in the football sector, in particular for the big teams in the big markets. However, the higher 
revenues did not translate into profitability for clubs: while small clubs were inclined to embark on 
oftentimes risky business strategies to keep track with big teams, also the latter jeopardised their 
economic viability by paying astronomic sums for player services due to a rat race for sporting 
success (Hamil & Walters, 2010; Hamil, 2014). Besides having a tremendously positive effect on club 
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Schubert & Könecke (2015) explain that notions of financial doping are neither a new phenomenon nor 
restricted to football only: For example, Britain’s success in the Olympic Games 2012, which has been 
dependent largely on funding of elite sport from the National Lottery, had already been likened to financial 
doping in the British press (Hayward 2012).  Also the Euroleague Basketball started to enforce its own set of 
FFP rules from season 2015/16 onwards in order to stop clubs from living beyond their means (Euroleague 
Basketball, 2015). North American major sports, on the other hand, seem to be immune to financial doping, 
due to a framework of competition regulation incorporating aggressive redistribution of broadcasting and 
commercial revenues, salary caps and luxury taxes, and aggressive central control over new player recruitment 
via draft systems,  all designed to ensure the maximum uncertainty of outcome by encouraging player  
resource parity amongst competing clubs whilst also, arguably, facilitating club owners’ objective of profit 
maximisation.  
3
 The scale of financial mismanagement saw Rangers being forced to re-form as a new business entity and re-
enter the Scottish professional league pyramid at tier four. In addition to Rangers, four other top tier Scottish 
clubs (Dundee FC, 2010; Dunfermline FC, 2013; Hearts, 2013; Motherwell FC, 2002) have all collapsed into 
bankruptcy in the last fifteen years, reflecting the deep-seated nature of the culture of over-spending in 
Scottish football that pertained until very recently 
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football (in both sporting and financial terms) due to an enormous increase in income from the sale 
of broadcasting rights, ironically, the UCL widened the financial gaps between clubs (Franck, 2010; 
Haugen & Solberg, 2010). This drift was exacerbated by the famous 1995 Bosman case, which by 
allowing players to leave on a free transfer at the end of their contracts, and abolishing national 
quotas, fuelled hyper-inflation in elite player wages. The two major effects can be summarised as 
follows: First, a migration of player talents towards the major leagues and teams and a competitive 
disadvantage for the smaller market leagues and their teams (Dejonghe & Van Opstal, 2009); 
second, a shift of bargaining power from clubs to players and thus a dramatic increase in player 
salaries (cf. García, 2011; Olsson, 2011), accelerated by the advent and proliferation of player agents 
who have proved effective in boosting player salaries.  
By the later 1990s, Europe’s football economy was beginning to demonstrate signs of 
‘overheating’, with many clubs making substantial losses and a growing problem of overdue 
payables. The initial impetus for enforced financial regulation on European level was a request by 
clubs themselves in 1999 (UEFA, 2016a). As a response, UEFA set up a task force to look into 
licensing. After a pilot project involving eight member associations, in 2002 the governing body 
decided to introduce a licensing system as of 2004/05, which was modelled after the German 
domestic club licensing system. From that moment onwards, clubs that wished to compete in UEFA’s 
competitions had to meet minimum criteria in different categories (sporting, infrastructure, 
personnel, legal and financial) to obtain a license (Morrow, 2014).  
The scope of application of club licensing is  thus around 700 clubs in European top-divisions 
that may potentially qualify for UEFA competitions.4 It is important to note that the licensing 
procedure is not carried out by UEFA itself but delegated to the national member associations or 
their appointed leagues as the licensing body (licensor), which may even define stricter criteria. 
Almost half of UEFA member associations apply the system to their top two leagues (some even go 
beyond). The requirements were revised in 2005 and again in 2008 to add the provision of budget 
forecasts as well as to extend the ‘no overdue payment rule’. The latter demands from the clubs to 
have no overdue payables to employees (e.g. players) and other clubs as well as tax-authorities and 
can be considered the key criterion of the system (Peeters & Szymanski, 2014a). By 2008, UEFA was 
asserting that the club licensing system was already beginning to have a positive effect in terms of 
raising standards across European club football (UEFA, 2008). However, European football clubs 
continued to make significant losses.  
 
                                                          
4 The number of clubs varies from year to year due to the (in some countries rather often) changing number of 
teams per league. In the 2015/16 season the total number of licence applicants was 548 out of 722 top-




Notions of financial doping in European club football 
Apparently, former UEFA chief executive Lars Christer Olsson was the first to use the expression 
financial doping in the context of the implementation of club licensing in 2004 (UEFA, 2004). The 
term has since gained increasing prominence both in popular (e.g. Wilson, 2009) and political 
discourse (e.g. All Party Parliamentary Football Group, 2009) as well as academic literature (e.g. 
Gammelsæter & Senaux, 2011; Morrow, 2011; Schubert & Könecke, 2015) against the background of 
the increasing extent of external funding by public, private or corporate benefactors in European 
club football. Arsenal FC manager Arséne Wenger, for example, used the term in relation to the 
lavish spending of Chelsea owner Roman Abramovich (Wilson, 2009). The Russian businessman had 
taken over the club in 2003 and had since distorted the transfer market with record net transfer fees 
(Vrooman, 2007). Potentially triggered by Abramovich’s perceived success at Chelsea, there has 
been a sharp increase of club acquisitions by wealthy individuals across Europe (e.g. England: 
Chelsea; Manchester City; Spain: Málaga, Valencia, Atlético de Madrid; France: Paris St. Germain, 
Monaco; Russia: Anzhi Makhachkala; Ukraine: Shakhtar Donetsk). Besides such backing by private 
benefactors, the first decade of this millennium also saw increasing support of clubs by public 
bodies. In Spain, as referred to earlier, several clubs allegedly received illegal state aid, leading to 
investigations by the European Commission. Also Italian clubs enjoyed indirect support from local 
authorities by soft taxation (Storm & Nielsen, 2012). Furthermore, corporate funding of clubs is 
illustrated by the case of German clubs Bayer 04 Leverkusen and VfL Wolfsburg as well as most 
recently RB Leipzig, where the enterprises Bayer, Volkswagen and Red Bull, respectively, regularly 
provide financial means for the respective club. 
Müller et al. (2012, pp. 123-4) defined ‘financial doping’ as 
‘financial means not earned by a club directly or indirectly through its sporting 
operations or supporter reputation, but rather provided by an external investor, 
benefactor or creditor detached from sporting merit and supporter reputation as 
well as from sustainable investment motivations.’ 
 
After being elected in 2007, UEFA’s president Michel Platini referred to financial doping on several 
occasions, as he declared the fight against the financial deficiencies in European club football as one 
of the major objectives during his tenure. The Frenchman was thus one of the dominant actors 
behind the implementation of the FFP regime. By empirically investigating the discursive dynamics 
that preceded the passage of FFP, Schubert, Könecke, & Pitthan (2016) have shown that strong 
discourse coalitions were formed around powerful narrative – such as the storylines of traditional 
sporting values in European football being undermined by financial forces as well as the 
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stigmatisation of making debts as ‘cheating’ and ‘unfair’. The increasing loss-making of clubs was no 
longer only perceived as dangerous from an economic perspective but now also as problematic from 
a sport ethical viewpoint, in that clubs that relied on benefactors were labelled as cheaters gaining 
an unfair advantage by manipulating the competition.5 Reinterpreting and thus framing the 
problems as such provided a strong ideological foundation for enforced European regulation and 
offered a convenient reasoning, but also one nevertheless very well-supported by the economic 
evidence of chronic loss-making across European football, for crucial actors to strategically position 
themselves as moral authorities and to push through the favoured policy solution that was to 
become UEFA FFP (Schubert et al., 2016). 
Financial doping and the integrity of sporting competitions  
Even though UEFA does not use the term financial doping in any official releases, it has become part 
of the mainstream sport business vocabulary (Hamil, 2014). Schubert & Könecke (2015) 
conceptualise the term and systematically identify parallels with ‘classical’ (or physiological) doping. 
The authors state that while the latter aims at increasing sporting success by the use of prohibited 
substances and methods, financial doping implies the use of financial means for the same ends. They 
posit that, such as with physiological doping, also financial doping manipulates the four core values 
of sport that are commonly brought forward to justify anti-doping policy, namely i) health, ii) 
fairness and equal opportunities, iii) naturalness of sporting performance, iv) exemplary function: 
(i) Health: A rhetorical device frequently used by media when reporting on the financial or 
economic situation of companies or states is the use of vocabulary from the health care 
sector. In our case, the health of an athlete would correspond to the financial situation of a 
club. From a financial or economic perspective, financial doping can be seen critically, as in 
comparison to conventional sources of income for clubs (e.g. broadcasting rights, gate 
receipts, merchandising), money injections from investors seem more ‘volatile’, as ‘the 
provision of funds stems from the decision and motivation of a single individual’ (Franck & 
Lang, 2014, p. 6). This fosters a dependency of clubs from those injections, without which 
they would be unable to survive financially. Furthermore, Franck (2014) remarks that a 
business model that makes clubs reliant on benefactors crowds out the incentive for sound 
management. A vivid example of the dangers of clubs being in the hands of private 
investors and the resulting dependencies is provided by the case of Málaga FC, where the 
                                                          
5 Interestingly, as Schubert, Könecke, & Pitthan (2016) remark, opposition against such narratives and stricter 
financial regulation was hardly discernible in the public/media discourse: statements by the new owners of 
Manchester City, for example, who argued that only external money could ever break the monopoly of 
Europe’s richest clubs, remained exceptions.  
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private investor stopped his payments leading to almost a complete sell-off of the team. 
Furthermore, recent research supports the idea that clubs with private majority investors 
leads to lower profitability as compared to clubs with distributed ownership (Rohde & 
Breuer, 2016). 
(ii) Fairness and equal opportunities: In general, it could be said that the more successful a 
club, the better its opportunities to gain financial support due to its higher market 
potential (e.g. through lucrative sponsoring deals). Financial doping evades this idea 
because funding is oftentimes provided independently from sporting success. In the case of 
the Russian team Anzhi, for instance, apparently it was neither the tradition of the club 
(founded not earlier than 1991) nor outstanding sporting success, which led to the 
takeover by a Russian billionaire in 2011 and the signing of well-known players thereafter. 
More recently, the German club RB Leipzig provides another example, where the multi-
corporate enterprise Red Bull took over the playing rights in 2009 of the back then fifth-tier 
club. After a series of promotions, the club recently finished second and qualified for the 
UEFA Champions League in its first Bundesliga season 2016/17. Such examples circumvent 
the principle of one’s own merit, which sport in particular is supposed to represent (Lenk, 
2010). 
(iii) Naturalness of sporting performance: The idea behind naturalness is that athletes are 
supposed to compete against each other on the basis of their natural abilities. In the 
context of financial doping this corresponds to the ‘natural’ market potential of a club, 
which results from aspects such as past sporting success, historical development and 
tradition as well as reputation and attractiveness. An excessive funding of football clubs by 
investors could be described as an ‘artificial manipulation’ respectively, as it is detached 
from own revenue streams such as gate receipts, broadcasting, sponsoring or 
merchandising. This is exemplified in the principle of progress through promotion & 
relegation, i.e. progress on the basis of sporting merit. This principle is central to the 
European sport model – for example, it is incorporated into the UEFA Statutes (Article 
51bis) (UEFA 2016c). 
(iv) Exemplary function of sport: Professional clubs serve to a wide extent as an organisational 
role model for the non-professional sport sector. For example, we can observe that 
amateur clubs adapt the logic of progress also in lower leagues by an increasing 
professionalization. Such a development has been detectable for decades. Väth (1997) 
noted that due to the well-covered example of professional football in the media, also in 




Schubert & Könecke (2015) conclude from their thought experiment that the arguments that 
underpin anti-doping policy could well be transferred to the case of financial doping in European 
club football. Excessive funding through benefactors as well as debt-led player acquisition and salary 
payment to achieve sporting success seem to violate core values intrinsic to sport. However, such as 
with physiological doping (cf. Houlihan, 2002), also in the case of financial doping the authors posit 
that these arguments are inconsistent to some extent. For example, Schubert & Könecke qualify the 
naturalness argument by arguing that no club historically is completely free from direct or indirect 
external influence, whether it be political or economic. This might call into question the idea of a 
club’s own revenues that FFP’s break-even constraint (see below) is largely based on. Furthermore, 
concerning the equal opportunity argument, the general question concerning the desirable extent of 
equal opportunities could be raised. Müller et al. (2012, p. 139) note that ‘it is neither possible nor 
preferable to fully equalize all factors that have an influence on a particular competition; for 
example, cultural, sociological and economic determinants’. 
  Yet despite potential inconsistencies, the situation in European football was considered 
illegitimate at least by a consensus of the most influential actors across the football community – 
UEFA, national associations, clubs and their representative body the ECA, and national leagues and 
their representative body the EPFL. Financial doping and the unequal distribution of external 
financial resources was increasingly regarded as a distortion of competition favouring a few clubs, 
thus manipulating the integrity of the competitions, as outlined by Olsson (UEFA, 2004). 
Furthermore, there was a genuine concern among stakeholders about a systemic financial collapse 
in European football. In this context, UEFA introduced FFP, one of its major objectives being to stop 
clubs from living beyond their means when pursuing sporting success.6   
 
UEFA Financial Fair Play 
The concept explained 
Despite the efforts of the club licensing procedure, the aggregate net losses of European top-
division clubs continued to rise and in 2009 were estimated at € 1.2 billion, i.e. almost  double the 
amount observed for the year before (UEFA, 2011). The scale of this financial instability in European 
                                                          
6
 It is believed by many that an alternative major driver behind FFP was the desire of big clubs from large 
markets to protect themselves from new, super-resource rich entrants to the elite. In fact, UEFA’s president 
justified the reforms by asserting that it were “mainly the owners that asked us to do something: Roman 
Abramovich, [Milan’s] Silvio Berlusconi, [Internazionale’s] Massimo Moratti. They do not want to fork out any 
more” (Guardian, 2009). 
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football led UEFA to introduce its FFP initiative as an extension to the UEFA club licensing system. 
After it had been approved by UEFA’s Executive Committee in September 2009, the FFP regulations 
were released in May 2010. In 2012 and again in 2015, UEFA published revised editions of the 
concept (UEFA, 2015c). The policy contains an updated version of the club licensing system as well as 
the new club monitoring rules.  
While the focus of club licensing is on the individual club’s going concern ability with the aim 
to safeguard the continuity of the ongoing competitions, the objectives of FFP are rather designed to 
ensure a long-term financial stability. The fundamental objective of FFP is to encourage clubs to 
improve their financial management and financial performance and to achieve a sustainable balance 
between income, spending and investments (Morrow, 2014). This objective manifests in the break-
even-requirement: Put simply, it states that clubs wishing to participate in European competitions 
are not allowed to spend more than they earn. Yet the demand from the clubs to operate on the 
basis of their own revenues is sophisticated, since allowable expenses and income are defined in 
great detail. Basically, the relevant expenses – including cost of sales, employee benefits expenses, 
other operating expenses, player transfer amortization or expense and finance costs – must not 
exceed relevant income, which is defined as revenue (gate receipts, broadcasting rights, sponsorship 
and advertising, commercial activities, other operating income), player transfer profit or income, 
finance income and excess proceeds on disposal of tangible fixed assets (UEFA, 2015c). It is 
important to note that the provisions allow clubs to exclude expenses for youth development, 
infrastructure and community development activities. The reason why these exceptions exist is 
because investment in these areas facilitates and encourages the development of sustainable and 
sounder business models of clubs (Franck, 2014). 
UEFA started monitoring clubs in the 2013/14 season based on clubs’ financial results from 
season 2011/12 onwards. Except for the first monitoring period which assessed the two previous 
seasons, the balance of income and expenditure are calculated over a rolling three year period (see 
Table 1). Breaking-even is not an absolute position as the balance is subject to an acceptable 
deviation of € 5 million. Furthermore, to ensure a soft implementation of the break-even 
requirement, the deviation could exceed € 5 million up to € 45 million in the license seasons 2013/14 
and 2014/15 and up to € 30 million from the license seasons 2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18 
onwards, if the deficit is covered by contributions from equity participants or related parties. This 
accepted deviation will be further reduced thereafter. 
<<< Please insert Table 1 about here >>> 
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Table 1: The break-even determination (UEFA, 2015c, p. 38) 
Monitoring period Financial statements taken into account Acceptable Deviation (€m) 
T-2 T-1 T Covered Not covered 
2013/14 N/A 2012 2013 45 5 
2014/15 2012 2013 2014 45 5 
2015/16 2013 2014 2015 30 5 
2016/17 2014 2015 2016 30 5 
2017/18 2015 2016 2017 30 5 
2018/19 2016 2017 2018 <30 5 
 
It is critical to remark that only those clubs that qualify for UEFA club competitions on sporting 
merit are subject to the monitoring process, which added up to 237 clubs in total during the first 
monitoring period. Different to club licensing, club monitoring is conducted by UEFA itself and 
implemented consistently across all 55 member associations, demonstrating the governing body’s 
seriousness. Further, whilst the club licensing system is operated by the clubs’ own association (or 
the respective leagues) (Morrow, 2014), the approach adopted by UEFA for FFP has been to set up 
the so-called UEFA Club Financial Control Body (CFCB), which is composed of qualified experts in the 
financial and legal fields in charge of overseeing the monitoring process, to control the 
implementation of the process.7 The CFCB is divided into an Investigatory Chamber for the 
monitoring and investigation stage and an Adjudicatory Chamber for the judgment stage of the 
proceedings (UEFA, 2015b). It has been established as a UEFA Organ for the Administration of Justice 
and has the competence to impose disciplinary sanctions on clubs in the case of non-fulfilment of 
the requirements, ranging from warnings up to disqualifications from future competitions and the 
withdrawal of titles. The final decisions may be appealed directly to the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS) in Lausanne. 
 As stated above, a number of clubs have been sanctioned since FFP has taken effect, mostly 
due to the presence of significant overdue payables. In the majority of cases, the imposed sanctions 
took the form of financial penalties. However, a few clubs were also excluded from participating in 
future competitions for which they would otherwise qualify, such as in the case of several clubs from 
east and south-east Europe (UEFA, 2016b). Among the more prominent clubs that were fined due to 
breaches of the break-even requirement are Paris Saint-Germain (UEFA CFCB, 2014b) and 
Manchester City (UEFA CFCB, 2014a): Sanctions imposed on both clubs through settlement 
                                                          
7
 The Club Financial Control Body replaced the UEFA Club Financial Control Panel (CFCP) in July 2012. While the 
panel could only refer cases to UEFA’s Organs for Administration of Justice, the new body is empowered with 
the ability to independently impose disciplinary measures. Along with this change came the clear formulation 
of possible disciplinary measures (UEFA, 2014). 
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agreements included a € 60 million fine each, the demand to limit transfer spending in the next two 
years as well as a reduction of their squad size from 25 to 21 players.8  
Until the 2014/15 season, 24 clubs had failed to comply with the break-even requirement. 
Settlement agreements with the clubs could be reached in all cases but one (FC Dinamo Moskva) 
(UEFA, 2016a). Notably, despite considerable complaints, all clubs in the first monitoring period 
accepted the disciplinary measures imposed and refrained from appealing to the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS). Thus, UEFA seems very  satisfied with the impact of the regulations so 
far. In fact, the governing body communicated that from 2012 to 2015 the aggregate net losses of 
top European clubs have decreased from € 1.7 billion to € 320 million, and also the overdue payables 
have decreased by almost 92% from 2011 (UEFA, 2016d). So one of the key achievements of FFP 
seems to be that European football clubs have indeed become financially much healthier and their 
governance better scrutinized (Asser Institute, 2017). Surely, a critical affirmation of FFP’s success 
also is that the English Premier League has adopted its own version of it on a national level in 2013, 
called ‘Short Term Cost Control and Sustainability Provisions’ (Premier League, 2016, page 117).  
Further, UEFA is also following an active communication policy to increase understanding and 
transparency of the policy among its stakeholders (see, for example, the endorsement of the current 
FFP regulations by the European Club Association: ECA, 2015). The revisions of its initial version also 
indicate the governing body’s responsiveness to areas for improvement. For example, the current 
2015 edition now allows  capital investments after a change in club ownership, to facilitate a re-
structuring, and also takes into account disadvantages faced by clubs due to sudden economic 
shocks or severe market structural deficiencies within its operating region (UEFA, 2015a).  
Taking stock: the scholarly debate 
After initial reluctance following the publication of the FFP concept in 2010, the amount of scholarly 
literature focusing on this policy has considerably increased recently. The contributions can be 
roughly grouped in economic (or finance-based), socio-political and legal science-based 
perspectives, while the first category clearly dominates (see Table 2). The two works by Schubert 
and colleagues that examine   FFP with a socio-political focus have already been presented above. 
The aim of this section is to provide an overview of the economic and legal contributions on FFP. 
<<< Please insert Table 2 about here >>> 
                                                          
8 The way in which Paris Saint-Germain’s signing of Brazilian striker Neymar in summer 2017 for the record sum 
of € 222 million was arranged will put FFP yet again to the test. 
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Table 2: Scholarly perspectives on Financial Fair Play (alphabetical order) 
Focus* Contributions 
ECONOMIC Descriptive/Interpretive Experimental Data-based 
 
Budzinski (2014); Budzinski & 
Szymanski (2015); Franck 
(2014); Hamil (2014); Maxcy 
(2014); Müller et al. (2012); 
Schubert (2014); Szymanski 
(2014); Vöpel (2011, 2013) 
Drut & Raballand (2012; 
Franck & Lang (2014); 
Madden (2015); Sass (2016); 
Peeters & Szymanski 
(2014a, 2014b); Preuss, 
Haugen, & Schubert (2014) 
Dimitropoulos, 
Leventis, & Dedoulis 
(2016); Morrow (2014) 
SOCIO-POLITICAL Theoretic 
Schubert & Könecke (2015) 
Empirical 
Schubert et al. (2016) 
LEGAL  Geey (2011); Flanagan (2013); Lindholm (2010); Long (2012); Mavroidis, Duval, & 
Mataija (2013) 
*The classification is made according to the major focus of the contributions. It is acknowledged that some 
of them assess FFP from several angles. 
 
Contributions with an economic focus 
Overall, the assessment of FFP is quite heterogeneous. It will be shown in the following that authors 
seem to be at odds with each other over the legitimacy, feasibility and implications of the 
intervention. Müller, Lammert & Hovemann (2012) analyse UEFA’s motivation to act and offer sound 
reasoning about the extent to which excessive external funding undermines the integrity of sporting 
competitions. Moreover, given that there is a systemic risk in overspending they consider the 
regulation as theoretically legitimated from a sport economic perspective. Such a view is contested 
by Vöpel (2011, p. 59), who argues that ‘[e]mpirically, insolvency has not been shown to be a serious 
problem in professional football and, moreover, there is no obvious systemic risk resulting from the 
insolvency of a single club that would justify tighter regulation.’ The author questions the legitimacy 
of the whole policy, as in the past empirically neither insolvency as a consequence of financial 
instability nor monopolisation due to unbalanced competition have been regarded as a serious 
problem. Also Peeters & Szymanski (2014) and Szymanski (2014), while acknowledging that football 
clubs are historically loss-making, make the point that only a tiny proportion ever go out of 
existence, and typically, if they go bankrupt, they simply re-enter their respective competitions with 
new owners. This, as the authors argue, is evidence of a natural, economic, self-righting process 
within the industry. Hamil (2014) explicitly objects to this perception by arguing that the current 
financial crisis in European football is of unprecedented proportions; for him, the implementation of 
FFP is thus a reasonable and logical response to this situation. Furthermore, another point by Hamil 
(2014) is that statements about the apparent stability of European football place little importance on 
the need to protect the interests of creditors of bankrupt clubs. 
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Morrow’s (2014) report is exceptional in that it is the first and only study that builds on 
interviews with many actors involved in the operation of FFP (e.g. representatives of clubs, 
governing bodies and leagues; clubs’ auditors; financial experts). The author states that interviewees 
widely accepted the rationale and need for enhanced financial regulation and that there is 
considerable support for FFP. However, there are also a number of concerns which emerged out of 
the interviews, above all ‘centred on UEFA’s willingness and capacity to enforce its regulations given 
the political and economic context of professional football and the implications of regulatory 
enforcement, sporting and financial’ (ebd, p. 7). Also Drut & Raballand (2012) remark that the 
credibility of FFP is essentially dependent on UEFA’s ability and willingness to sanction some of the 
most famous clubs in Europe if they are in breach of the rules.  
A series of contributions deals with the effects and outcomes of FFP on different areas. Based 
on a simple game theoretic model, Franck & Lang (2014) derive conditions under which FFP is 
desirable from a welfare perspective: Given that in the financial year 2010 more than half of 
European top division clubs reported net losses, the authors state that clubs rather tend to be risk 
seeking. Furthermore, riskier investment strategies are induced by the existence of benefactor 
owners (or sugar daddies, as they call them). According to the authors, the FFP regulations are 
welfare-enhancing in an uncertain economic environment (e.g. through a higher Champions League 
prize) and the possibility that private or public sugar daddies step in to pay the open bills will be 
severely restricted.  
The outcomes of the break-even requirement are examined in two further papers (Sass, 2016; 
Vöpel, 2011). Both predict negative consequences on long-term competitive balance based on the 
interpretation that FFP restricts the outside investment that small clubs would need to keep pace 
with top teams. In fact, increasing CB is not an explicitly declared objective of FFP. Peeters 
& Szymanski (2014a) even speculate that this is probably because UEFA realised that the regime is 
unlikely to improve it. Based on the fact that FFP only limits spending of an individual club in 
proportion to its own resources (i.e. a relative budget cap), the authors claim that the regime will 
produce an anti-competitive outcome which is comparable to the horizontal salary cap agreements 
existing in North America, without the latter’s pro-competitive balance effects. Similarly, Szymanski 
(2014, p. 227) notes that the policy reinforces the hierarchy that has long been established and 
bluntly concludes that ‘[t]he real problem with Financial Fair Play is that it does not offer Fair Play at 
all. It is an abuse of language’. Moreover, Peeters & Szymanski (2014a) as well as Budzinski (2014) 
and Maxcy (2014) show how FFP shifts rents from the players to the owners due to the decline of 
clubs’ expenses for players. Hence, Maxcy (2014) states that FFP seems largely to be a response to 
the Bosman ruling in that one impact will be to at least partly restore the pre-Bosman balance of 
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power. There is also common agreement among these authors that the reduced competition 
intensity would be bad for fans and consumers. 
The contributions of Vöpel (2013) and Budzinski (2014) are particularly noteworthy because 
they assess FFP from a competition economic perspective and also derive some legal implications. 
Both authors follow a very similar line of argument by addressing FFP according to three criteria: 
They agree that there is legitimacy in the objectives of FFP but find that in its current shape the 
regulations violate the principles of inherence (to the objectives) and proportionality (towards the 
effects). Inherence is violated as the authors do not see any signs of a systematic market failure in 
European football. What is more, they even claim that UEFA’s allocation mechanism providing 
money according to ranking positions significantly contributes to a rat race-styled positional 
competition and short-term oriented incentives. As Budzinski (2014, p. 88, emphasis in original) put 
it, ‘overinvestment does not appear to be inherent to football competition – instead it appears to be 
inherent to other UEFA regulations’ due to the allocation scheme. Proportionality is considered 
violated due to the unnecessarily restrictive outcomes of the break-even constraint: the relative 
character of the budget cap entails an incumbent protection effect by restraining smaller clubs to 
catch up to richer clubs.  
Against the background of such harsh criticism, Franck (2014) took issue with the negative 
judgments of FFP in literature. He provided an extensive response to what he perceived as the three 
main points of critique, which he describes as (i) FFP limits injections of external money (cf. Madden, 
2015); (ii) FFP restricts competition in the player market without at the same time achieving benefits 
from more balanced competition such as in North American leagues (cf. Peeters & Szymanski, 2014); 
(iii) FFP ossifies the current club hierarchy by creating some sort of barrier to entry for small clubs 
(cf. Vöpel, 2011). Franck’s objection to the first strand of criticism is that – while acknowledging that 
indeed it will become more difficult for benefactors to fund player payrolls with external money – 
FFP will restore incentives for efficient and good management at clubs, given that they cannot 
expect to be bailed-out any more. FFP thus tries to bring an end to what he had earlier called a 
‘zombie race’, in which clubs systematically overinvest yet do not exit the market despite being 
insolvent (Franck, 2010). In this sense, the logic of UEFA FFP is that it represents some sort of 
‘rehabilitation’ system through its settlement agreements, which provide a pathway for clubs to 
return to the path of financial sustainability. Secondly, Franck (2014) states that contrary to a US 
salary cap, FFP formulates a relatively soft restriction of competition. Moreover, he sees salary caps 
as operated in the closed-shop North American leagues as the wrong benchmark for assessing the 
potential of FFP. To him, the open league structure in Europe together with the opportunity for top 
teams to compete in European tournaments are another way to ensure exciting games of 
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competitors of comparable strength. Thirdly, the author challenges the assumption that FFP will 
freeze the hierarchy of European football by claiming that there is no mechanism which 
systematically allocates money injections to small clubs in order to make them more competitive. On 
the contrary, he argues that FFP breaks the ‘money comes to money’ dynamics and increases the 
importance of ‘management quality’ (p. 195).  
However, Franck’s (2014, p. 210) remark that ‘FFP revitalizes the importance of management 
quality as an avenue for achieving sporting success’ could be qualified by the recent findings of 
Dimitropoulos et al. (2016), who empirically investigated the impact of FFP upon accounting 
practices. The authors demonstrate in what way, as a consequence of the FFP demands, clubs 
increasingly adopt practices which compromise accounting quality to project an image of financial 
robustness. The threat that clubs may be inclined to find ways of creative book-keeping in order to 
meet UEFA’s financial criteria has already been mentioned by Schubert and colleagues (Preuss, 
Haugen, & Schubert, 2014; Schubert, 2014). The authors examine the relationship between UEFA 
and the clubs in the context of FFP from an agency theory perspective and argue that potential 
conflicts of interest between both actors together with asymmetric information create incentives for 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the clubs. 
Contributions with a legal focus 
Also the legal status of FFP is contested. A few contributions focus on the policy from a competition 
law perspective and raise issues referring to the predicted anti-competitive outcomes. Mavroidis, 
Duval & Mataija (2013) highlight the necessity to put in place precise sanctions linked with the 
nature of the infringement in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the enforcement process. 
Otherwise UEFA would risk that sanctions are perceived as being subject to extra-legal factors 
(popularity, economic power etc.), which could raise the risk of legal challenges before national or 
European Courts. Lindholm (2010) concludes that FFP is not compatible with European law as the 
existence of financial problems is not sufficient in order to show that the policy is necessary and 
suitable. Long (2012) illustrates examples how FFP may have inhibiting effects on competition for 
clubs, players and even sponsors. However, it is noted by Geey (2011) that the process of drafting 
the rules has been conciliatory and that stakeholders such as the clubs had the opportunity to voice 
their displeasure at the formative stages. Even though most authors agree that FFP may infringe 
European competition policies, Flanagan (2013, p. 164) concludes that there is ‘no conclusive 
evidence that the concept will inhibit economic competition’ and that it will inhibit the free 
movement of workers. Even in the event that empirical evidence could be adduced to this end, 
Flanagan posits that UEFA could present a reasonable case that FFP is a suitable and proportionate 
15 
 
mechanism to achieve the legitimate aim of financial stability under an endogenous growth model. 
Also Geey (2011, para. 48} highlights that ‘UEFA has had detailed discussions with the European 
Commission to ensure that there are robust legal arguments underpinning FFPRs [Financial Fair Play 
rules, remark of the author]’. UEFA has been particularly diligent in securing the active support of 
the European Commission for FFP implementation (UEFA, 2014). Further, so far FFP has withstood 
all legal challenges (Asser Institute, 2017). Most recently, in 2015 the European Court of Justice 
declared ‘manifestly inadmissible’ a challenge to the legality of the policy (UEFA, 2015d). 
Looking ahead: the way forward in FFP research  
To sum up, it has been shown that FFP constitutes a very controversial research topic and 
assessments tend to differ sharply in several regards. It appears that the debate has to some extent 
become quite ideological, with some authors arguing from a neo-liberal perspective supportive of 
deregulation, while others advocate stricter central regulation. It should be taken into account, 
however, that even though scientists tend to be idealised as objective, impartial authorities, they are 
themselves actors in the larger social order and may have vested interests (Best, 2013). This refers of 
course to both proponents and opponents of the policy. Strikingly, while FFP has been thoroughly 
addressed in sport economic literature and also provoked some contributions with a juridical focus, 
there is great scarcity of research that investigates the policy from other scientific perspectives. For 
example, given the utmost importance of ‘fair play’ for modern sport, it is surprising to observe that 
as yet the regulation has invoked only one contribution with a philosophico-ethical emphasis 
(Schubert & Lopez Frias, 2017). 
 Another potential avenue for future research is to assess the public perception of FFP. While 
supporters or fans are a critical stakeholder for the success of the football business, their significance 
is not reflected in their capability to exert influence (Holt, 2009). Their ability to immediately 
influence the policy process can therefore be assumed to be quite low. Nevertheless, obtaining the 
opinion of supporters towards FFP may provide important insights that could have a bearing on the 
policy. More research is also needed that takes into account the knowledge from practitioners 
involved in club licencing and FFP, which according to UEFA adds up to more than 1.100 people in 
Europe (UEFA, 2016a). Finally, to better make sense of how FFP works, we need more detailed 
accounts of the range and interaction of lobby groups and elites in the decision-making process. 
Examining this might reveal interesting information about the power play at work at the apex of 





The aim of the chapter was to explore financial doping in European football as a form of 
manipulation of the integrity of club competitions. UEFA as the highest institution of football in 
Europe has tried to address the implications of financial doping through FFP. In a situation of 
increasing financial distress caused by clubs who were overindulged in systemic loss making (just like 
‘zombies’ or ‘junkies’ in a metaphoric sense), the governing body prescribed them some sort 
rehabilitation programme to prevent them from breaking bad (and break even instead). FFP is 
construed as a long-term governance project and the future development of this heavily contested 
policy will remain exciting to observe.  
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